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In the Clouds: On the Vagueness of
Atmospheres
Dans les nuages : le vague des ambiances
Andreas Rauh
1 A single drop does not constitute rain and a single droplet of water vapor does not make a
cloud. The cloud itself is a mutable whole, discrete, but without solid, stable boundaries.
When one descends into a cloud, one is surrounded by a diffuse nebulousness and finds
oneself  in a  space without corners or edges.  It  is  similar to someone experiencing a
certain  atmosphere  –  such  as  the  brassy  atmosphere  of  a  Christmas  market.  This
atmosphere is distinct from the gloomy atmosphere of urban backstreets. One can even
list the material  ingredients that make up the atmosphere of Christmas markets:  the
warm light radiating from (real wax and electric) candles, the glittering of the opulent
display  of  goods,  the  warmth  emanating  from  human  crowds,  the  smell  of  roasted
almonds, baked apple, and bratwurst, the taste of mulled wine and sweet baked goods.
Yet once one has immersed oneself in the atmosphere of Christmas markets, one finds it
hard to match or ascribe the manifold aesthetic impressions to one concrete sensing of
atmosphere. The question is, which component of atmosphere is formative, and to what
extent? Generally speaking, atmosphere is experienced intrusively as a certain presence
of something. This kind of intra-atmospheric infinity has also made the cloud a popular
metaphor for  the internet  and online communities:  when data  move into the cloud,
conventional understandings of space and time become obsolete. Data become diffuse,
vague, and cloudy. Like clouds, data networks cover the Earth and add to its atmosphere
an electrosphere1, allowing the users of virtual worlds to upload their data and identities
into the cloud and experience immersion in global  information flows.  The notion of
atmosphere itself is connected to the meteorological metaphor of the cloud (alongside its
electronic counterpart),  and is known in both ordinary and exceptional contexts. The
atmosphere generates both weather and sense phenomena; it surrounds the Earth as well
as encompasses our sensual perceptions and influences both the unfolding of weather
events and the flow of perception. To be immersed in an aesthetic atmosphere is to be
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involved in affective worlds that color one’s own perceptions and steer them in certain
directions. That having been said, the very omnipresence of atmosphere implicitly claims
a  decisive  influence  on  our  perception,  attitude  and  action  and,  in  doing  so,  turns
aesthetics as aisthetics into a fundamental discipline of epistemological reflections.
2 The following paper sets out to explore such atmospheres, to examine what makes them
cloudy,  and  what  constitutes  their  vagueness2.  It  begins  with  a  short  definition  of
atmosphere before clarifying the central problem by examining vagueness in everyday
language.  The example of  the sorites paradox will  then be used to demonstrate how
vagueness has classically been understood, so that distinct forms of vagueness can be
differentiated and their  connections to atmosphere,  as  a  phenomenon,  can be better
shown. In concluding the argument, this clarification will be used to draw attention to
some methodological consequences for research into atmospheres.
3 The cloudy and nebulous aspect of the atmosphere is already indicated in its etymology:
the components ‘atmos’ and ‘sphaira’ form the image of a ‘vaporous sphere’ surrounding a
planet. Life on Earth is possible only by virtue of its atmosphere, which mediates between
the nothingness of space and the ‘everythingness’ of the world. Carried over into the field
of aesthetics, the atmosphere retains this indeterminate, intermediate position. It is the,
at first, inconspicuous ‘and’ in Gernot Böhme’s definition which uncovers in atmospheres
the  “relationship  between  one’s  state  at  a  given  time  and  the  qualities  of  one’s
surroundings. This and, this in-between, that by which the qualities of a setting relate to
one’s  condition,  this  is  the  atmosphere”  (Böhme,  1995,  p.  22-23)3.  With  this  ‘and’,  a
relationship is determined which could, generally speaking, also describe phenomena like
fear,  which seems to  lie  somewhere  between a  frightened subject  and a  frightening
object. The ‘and’ of the atmosphere also suggests that the atmosphere is not merely a
mediator, but prepares the ground for the mediation; that is, the frightened subject only
perceives an object as a frightening one, and is able to personally experience this kind of
perception, because of the atmosphere of fear. Thus, the atmosphere of fear should not be
understood solely as a subjective projection of an inner mood onto the world outside. The
‘and’  complicates  its  precision  and  the  intelligibility;  the  relation  is  always  and
everywhere  present  to  varying  degrees  of  markedness  and  intensity.  According  to
Herrmann Schmitz’s understanding of phenomena, it is perceived as affecting the felt
body, as individual feelings floating through space (see e.g., Schmitz, 2014, p. 30). Thus,
atmospheres can be defined as precognitive, or at least preverbal, phenomena. Because
they feature so prominently in everyday language and ‘atmosphere’, as a term, is used
matter-of-factly, a more thorough engagement with this concept is called for, as it is, in
fact, not always clear what precisely is being referred to.
 
Everyday Language and Vagueness
4 When discussing the topic of atmosphere, discrepancies are apparently unavoidable. On
the one hand,  we often understand one another with regard to atmospheres and by
means of atmospheres, but on the other hand, it is often impossible to describe a given
atmosphere, as one cannot pinpoint what one is feeling, where one is feeling it, and to
what degree it is being felt. The notion or concept of atmosphere or atmosphere itself
appears vague, nebulous, and ill-defined, a status that seems to deny the possibility of
advancing understanding. Of course, the problem of describing an atmosphere depends
on its intensity and nature, which can be as powerful as that of a Christmas market, or as
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subtle as the relaxed atmosphere of a quiet afternoon. This problem of description also
derives  from  the  vagueness  of  atmospheres  as  has  already  been  noted  above.  This
vagueness  precedes  the relationship between a  setting or  an environment  and one’s
individual state like an uncertainty constant preceding a formula. No matter how well-
defined and well-known the individual components of an ‘atmospheric recipe’ might be,
the vagueness is responsible for the deferral of the ‘atmospheric result’, for a surplus of
the sum of the individual elements which has to be taken into account, especially if one is
to study one of the summands. Vagueness is known primarily as a problem of language
deriving from predicates, while structurally it plays a role in metaphysics, epistemology
and the philosophy of language. It can thus cause problems in the field of aesthetics. It
has been pushed out of the focus of attention by the ideal of precise language, which is
particularly present in the sciences. Nonetheless, the occurrence of borderline cases, in
which  uncertainty  arises  regarding  the  applicability  of  a  predicate,  is  not  just
characteristic  of  everyday  language.  When  even  a  conceptual  analysis  is  unable  to
determine the applicability of a predicate, a predicate is considered vague; it possesses a
“predicative penumbra, in which neither truth nor falsehood clearly prevails. In other
words, tertium datur” (Buldt, 2001, p. 531-532)4. The sentence ‘The valley borders on the
mountain’  can serve as an example.  It  deals with two intelligible entities:  valley and
mountain. Where exactly, however, lies the border between the two? From which point is
the mountain no longer a mountain, but already a valley? Such problems of delineation
can also present themselves to a curator who is engaged in the atmosphere of his or her
exhibition. Regarding the hanging of paintings, a curator may ask him- or herself: when
does an exhibition become an exhibition? At what point is an exhibition furnished with
sufficient atmosphere? Does atmosphere increase as more paintings are hung, such as in
the so-called Petersburg style of hanging? Or is the atmosphere more agreeable when less
wall space is claimed, as in the style of hanging that places clear emphasis on individual
works?
5 Atmosphere is thus to be situated in this penumbra, in a conceptual or maybe ontological
half-shadow, as an ‘and’ mediating between a subjective state and the qualities of one’s
surroundings, as a third term in the subject-object dichotomy pragmatically employed on
an everyday basis. There are atmospheres that seem to adhere permanently to a given
place. There are atmospheres that, in line with the classical concept of vagueness, are
‘fickle’,  that  appear  ‘restless’  and  unstable,  that  are  ‘vagabond’.  The  uncertainty
concerning the unambiguous perceptibility of atmosphere,  its gradual intensity or its
feasibility makes atmosphere oscillate between ‘whether’ and ‘whether not’: its reception
turns on the question of whether or not the assignment of a predicate to an atmosphere
is appropriate, whether or not the perception of an atmosphere is dependent on one’s
own experiences – and if so, in what way – and whether or not an atmosphere is merely a
subjective mood. Furthermore, the production of  atmosphere turns on the question of
whether or not certain objects generate atmosphere, whether or not atmosphere emerges
from a specific constellation or setting in a room, and whether or not one can even
manufacture a certain atmosphere with regard to a certain sensory quality. Now bringing
the two concepts of ‘atmosphere’ and ‘vagueness’ together, I hope to be able to explain, or
at least shed light on, the indeterminate discussion of atmospheres in everyday language
as well as the uncertainty surrounding the creation of atmospheres.
6 In the context  of  everyday language,  vagueness  is  ascribed to statements,  situations,
descriptions and perceptions that are uncertain or that lack clarity or definition. In the
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scientific or academic context, such phenomenal conditions, which formally appear lucid
but whose content often leads to vague and metaphorical formulations, are neglected.
That St. Petersburg’s Hermitage boasts a fantastic atmosphere seems clear enough, but it
can only be roughly outlined to which paintings, constellations of paintings or interior
arrangements  this  atmosphere  is  attributable.  Vagueness  corresponds  to  a  kind  of
uncertainty, tied up not only with the fear of terminological indeterminacy but also with
the  potential  for  a  more  conscious  ambiguity.  Vagueness  is  an  unavoidable,  but  not
always  unwelcome,  effect.  This  is  because  “fuzzy  terms  can  be  used  more  flexibly”
(Schöne, 2011, p. 245), which is why a virtue is made out of necessity when it comes to
describing and conveying atmospheres. In doing so, one is able not only to describe, but
to  summon  a  certain  atmosphere.  This  also  holds  true  for  visual  means  of  artistic
expression, such as paintings, for if something is “very clear to see, it steers and restricts
the viewer by stealing from the imagination the scope of play” (Ullrich, 2002, p. 18)5. It
has been furthermore established in film studies that a lack of  focus can seduce the
viewer into becoming a part of the picture and fully immersed in it.
“The indeterminate  attracts  us  with  its  secrets,  which appear  to  lie  within  our
grasp, but then evade definite capture. We quickly become emotionally involved.
Thus it is a simultaneously distancing and inviting visuality. While focus is singular,
something can be out of focus to varying degrees and shades. […] Thus, the out-of-
focus  stirs  associations  and  is  open  to  emotional  reactions  on  the  part  of  the
viewer.” (Smid, 2012, p. 147)6
 
The Sorites Paradox
7 Classically, vagueness has variously been illustrated by the sorites paradox (‘sorós’, Greek
for ‘heap’), or the paradox of the heap; indeed, vagueness has often been investigated in
line with the sorites uncertainty (see Schöne, 2011). The sorites paradox is an example of
how  one’s  involvement  can  be  a  problem  in  terms  of  the  relationship  between  a
phenomenon and its description. Particularly from the perspective of artists of all “fields
of  aesthetic  work” (Böhme,  1995,  p.  35)7 who are  determined to  create  reproducible
atmospheres,  the  sorites  paradox  demonstrates  how  the  treatment  of  material
singularities  (with an objective  and subjective  focus)  systematically  veils  the turning
point  towards  the  qualitative  moment  of  touching  atmospheric  situations  in
circumstances of composition and trial.
8 The sorites paradox draws our attention to three forms of vagueness which can help us to
address  different  aspects  of  atmospheres  in  their  vagueness,  which  is  semantic,
ontological as well as epistemic. Through the vagueness of atmosphere, we can better
understand  how imprecision  can  enter  (scientific)  descriptions,  an  imprecision  from
which, ultimately, the everyday, metaphorical, and poetic talk of atmospheres stems. This
has methodological consequences that legitimize field studies with a scope of n=1.
9 Alongside its usage in everyday language, the terminological understanding of the concept
of vagueness derives from a reengagement with the sorites paradox in the twentieth
century and introduces a definition of  vagueness as the presence of  borderline cases
resistant to inquiry.8 The sorites paradox allows us to see the boundaries of a concept as
fluid. Take, for example, the concept of a ‘heap of sand’. A large pile of sand is imagined. If
one grain of sand is removed, what remains is still a pile, for if two piles of sand differ
only in the absence of a single grain, they are both either piles or not piles. If one thus
infers the rule that if n grains of sand constitute a pile, n-1 grains do as well, one arrives at
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the paradoxical conclusion that any collection of sand grains is a pile, including the single
grain that remains after all others have been removed. The absurdity also emerges at the
other end of the spectrum: a droplet of water vapor does not yet constitute a cloud. If one
were to add to this first droplet a second, one would still not have created a cloud. Thus, if
n droplets are not yet a cloud, neither are n+1 droplets, and, consequently, neither are
billions of droplets. Yet there are clouds that consist of billions of droplets. How is it
possible that concepts such as ‘pile’ or ‘cloud’, derived from the sorites paradox, are able
to designate objects that are not clouds or piles? Clearly, there is a striking contradiction
between the argument and its result, which is both counterintuitive and contraindicated.
For the final grain of sand is indeed not a pile just as billions of droplets do in fact form a
cloud.  The  sorites  paradox  appears  to  be  a  language game:  it  inevitably  brings  two
seemingly  similar  linguistic  concepts  into  conflict  with  each  other.  A  multitude  of
droplets and a cloud appear to be incommensurable and lead to paradox when brought
together and allowed to overlap in a sorites formulation.
10 Three ways to resolve this paradox come to mind: one could simply accept the argument’s
conclusion; one could hold the logic of argumentation to be fallacious and reject the
conclusion;  or  one  could  modify  or  reject  the  premises9.  If  one  were  to  accept  the
conclusion,  vagueness  critics  could  feel  vindicated  in  their  claim  that  vagueness
contributes  to  the  evaporation  of  concepts.  The  negative  connotation  attached  to
‘dissipation’ in this sense is related to the descriptive operation of a vague concept such
as ‘cloud’, which points dangerously in the direction of nihilism. The ‘tertium datur’ of
vagueness refers, however, to vagueness’s own characteristic logic, and to a pragmatic
approach to  a  phenomenon that  can be  precisely  named but  only  at  the  same time
vaguely (see Baecker, 2005, p. 33). The associated softening of conceptual boundaries is a ‘
liquefaction’  that,  in  contrast  to  ‘dissipation’,  is  to  be  understood  more  positively.
Furthermore, the logic of argumentation cannot be rejected; because of the simplicity of
argument and the few logical  principles applied,  it is  better accepted in the form of
polyvalent logics with graduated degrees of truth. Finally, the modification or rejection of
the premises of the sorites paradox provides for the possibility of eliminating the form of
vagueness at hand.
11 To sum up,  the sorites  paradox presents  itself  as  an interplay between the intuitive
plausibility of the individual steps in an argument and the absurdity resulting from a
logical conclusion. It thus highlights the difficulty of delineating a boundary between two
states that  in fact  flow into each other continuously and seamlessly.  The underlying
conditions by which the sorites argument proceeds are the iterative use of the modus
ponens,  in  which no allowance is  made for  interruption or suspension;  the tolerance
principle,  which permits small  changes;  and the binary or bivalence principle,  which
posits a binary framework of judgement involving true and false.
 
The Forms of Vagueness
12 The origins of vagueness can be traced to the relational triangle of world/language/self.
Vagueness appears possible at every level and thus three forms can be distinguished from
one another: semantic, ontological, and epistemic. These will form the points of reference
below,  allowing  us  to  explore  the  concept  and existence  of  atmosphere  in  terms  of
vagueness.
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13 Semantic vagueness is the indistinctness, in principle or in fact, of terms or concepts. A
term is  designated vague if  it  has  the  quality  of  exhibiting  imprecise  boundaries  or
borderline cases in which it cannot be ascertained whether an object belongs to the class
of objects that fall under said term. Vagueness points to sites of semantic incompleteness
or insufficiency. Here, the standard claim is made that vagueness is a sign of conceptual
dissipation as a result of poorly worked-out terms. The conceptual tolerance illustrated
by the sorites paradox, in combination with the lack of conditions by which the operation
of  adding  or  subtracting  can  be  interrupted,  allows  vague  predicates  to  be  treated
differently semantically, according to their degree, from precise ones.
14 Ontological  vagueness is  vagueness as an element of  the world and of reality.  It  is  the
property possessed by an object that makes it ambiguous, as a result of “a lack of clear
spatial boundaries resulting from a vague partial belonging” (Buddensiek, 2006, p. 55)10.
In terms of the example provided above – that of a mountain transitioning into a valley –
one is challenged: where does the valley begin and the mountain end? Apparently, one
must assume that the boundary is fluid and that a transitional zone exists which is not yet
entirely valley but which has ceased to be entirely mountain. However, this ontological
vagueness contains a problem: a vague object is one for which one cannot delineate clear
boundaries, but if one were to subtract successive parts of this object until all have been
subtracted, one would eventually reach the point where there is no object at all. This
would actually mark a fairly defined border. In order to avoid the supposition of a vague
object, one can also cite an object’s material independence from its concept and, rather,
inquire into the semantic or epistemic form of vagueness. Still,  that a mountain rises
above a valley to a distinct height, while a valley spreads into a plain, suggests that a
transition zone between mountain and valley exists.
15 Epistemic vagueness is vagueness in the sense of a deficiency of knowledge, in principle or
in fact, regarding the object under discussion. One could assume that both vague and
precise terms are semantically alike in that they establish clear boundaries. Even whole
sentences built around vague terms are clearly either true or false. Ignorance, however,
manifests  itself  as  ambiguity  regarding  the  assignment  of  truth  values,  arising,  for
example, from uncertainty concerning the full availability of all relevant information (see
Buldt, 2001, p. 538; Sainsbury, 2001, p. 54; Wolski, 1980, p. 143). In the sense of epistemic
vagueness,  the  sorites  paradox  provides  evidence  for  the  fact  that  at  least  one
precondition of a vague statement is false. Because a droplet is not a cloud and because
there must be a clear boundary between cloud and non-cloud, the rule ‘If n droplets do
not yet constitute a cloud, then neither do n+1 droplets’ must be in some way flawed.
However, it is impossible, using a quantity of n, to precisely delineate the boundary. For
when presented with a borderline case for a given vague term, we are left hopelessly
ignorant.  Thus,  epistemic  vagueness  denotes  that  the  terms  are  clear,  while  it
problematizes the context in which knowledge is acquired, which already arises with the
perceptions that the terms set out to describe. Humans are equipped with perceptual
capacities  that  are  unable  to  recognize  sharp  boundaries  and  hence  must  assume
fuzziness and uncertainty (see Schöne, 2011, p. 174-189).
16 Given the three forms of vagueness, one should deliberate on which or how many forms
of  vagueness  apply  to  atmosphere.  What  is  more,  one needs  to  distinguish  between
vagueness applying to the concept of atmosphere or atmosphere itself.
17 From  the  perspective  of  a  practitioner,  i.e.  someone  crafting  material  objects  and
constellations thereof, who – at least linguistically – feels obliged to differentiate between
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subject  and  object,  one  could  argue  that  atmospheres  are  neither  semantically  nor
ontologically but only epistemically vague. The problem of semantic vagueness is indeed
fed by the relation between atmosphere, as a corporeal phenomenon, and the abstract
concept of atmosphere. This does not, however, mean that the ‘and’ pinpointed in our
definition of atmosphere – which mediates between subjective states and the qualities of
settings  –  can  be  called  vague.  The  definition  focuses  on  that  which  comprises  an
atmosphere. It does so on a very general level, which causes the concept of atmosphere to
spread outwards extensively. This is tied to the overdetermination of the definition of
atmosphere: based in ‘subjective states’ and ‘the qualities of a setting’, the description of
atmosphere generally refers to the concrete ‘here and now’, while as a phenomenon it is
commonly  understood  as  ‘always  and  everywhere’.  The  question  as  to  whether
atmospheres are ontologically vague could be answered in the negative. For atmospheres
– which only become objects of perception by mediating between one’s particular state
and the qualities of one’s surroundings – one’s involvement, one’s being in the cloud, is of
decisive  importance.  This  affectedness  could  be  brought  up  against  the  presence  of
ontological vagueness, in the sense that it could be held responsible for concealing the
precise  ontological  boundary.  Applied  to  the  sorites  paradox,  this  means  that  it  is
important that over the course of a repeated operation, again and again one ties the
concept of ‘pile’ or ‘cloud’ to the outcome of this operation, even as, grain by grain or
drop by drop, the ontological framework itself shifts. Because of one’s involvement and in
accordance  with  the  tolerance  principle  mentioned  earlier,  the  point  at  which  this
framework is no longer compatible with the premises of the sorites paradox cannot be
pinned down. In the midst of one’s involvement in incremental steps, the concept has
become fluid, and one only realizes that something has gone awry when confronted with
an absurd final result. The problem of one’s involvement is closely tied to another: the
lack of  conditions determining when the operation is to be ceased. If,  in the course of
removing grains of sand, one were able to stop and reverse the last step, one could thus
locate the boundary between pile and non-pile. The parallels between the perception and
description of an atmosphere could be explained as follows: when one is involved in an
atmosphere  and  attempts  to  describe  it  through  a  continuous  enumeration  of  its
particular  elements,  one  cannot  call  the  cumulative  total  of  these  perceptions  an
atmosphere. One would have only named the sum of individual impressions, which falls
short  of  conveying  the  qualitative  idiosyncrasy  of  an  atmospheric  whole.  This  also
pertains to the processes of the production of atmosphere. Whether,  for example, an
exhibition is richly or sparsely organized, the point at which the atmosphere deriving
from its particular character can be felt is determined by the coordination of the mood
effects involved and the distanced usage of materials. Finally, the question as to whether
atmospheres are epistemically vague can be answered in the positive. In a way analogous
to St. Augustine’s ruminations on the difficulties of explaining time, the experience of
perception seems to allow speculation on the vagueness of  atmospheres.  Drawing on
Augustine,  if  one  speaks  of  atmospheres  in  an  everyday  context,  then  atmosphere
appears to be a clear and well-defined term. However, if one attempts to explain the term
atmosphere, its boundaries liquefy; the atmosphere appears vague and not susceptible to
a comprehensible explanation. No clear perception of atmosphere seems to be tied to the
clear definition of the term. The fact that the determining factor in the definition of
atmosphere is an ‘and’ does indeed render it difficult to clearly name an atmosphere’s
subjective components versus its objective ones. This would be made easier by means of
an ‘or‘, which would quickly help to answer the question as to whether atmospheres are
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attributable only to the subject or only to the object. Nonetheless, the ‘and’ emphasizes
precisely the ‘in between’ at the interface of subjective and objective. The ‘and’ allows for
the understanding, suspended and latent, of which factors determine an atmosphere and
to what extent. The ‘and’ thus supports the case that the vagueness of atmospheres is
epistemic. However, because the perception of atmosphere, through one’s being involved,
is  always  filed  under  the  pre-verbal  category  of  “immediate  sensation  and  physical
feeling”, atmosphere’s reality can only be demonstrated retrospectively (Thibaud, 2003,
p. 286)11.
18 Yet it is precisely the importance of involvement in an atmosphere which has the power
to change the association of atmosphere with the three forms of vagueness. From the
point  of  view  of  a  theoretician  who  is  concerned  with  the  conceptualization  of
atmospheres  according  to  the  phenomena  at  hand,  it  is  questionable  whether
atmospheres  could  not  also  be  vague  in  a  semantic  or  ontological  sense.  Given  the
semantic scope of the ‘and’ definition, one is tempted to ask: where is atmosphere, if it is
everywhere?  What  is  special  about  an  atmosphere  if  it  is  applicable  to  all  kinds  of
phenomena?  The  definition  of  atmosphere  does  not  merely  accept  this  situation  as
unavoidable; it receives it as part of the phenomenon. Additionally, semantic vagueness
seems  to  be  an  integral  part  of  everyday  linguistic  practice.  Yet  the  fact  that  it  is
perceived as an unproblematic element in everyday language does not  deny its  very
existence or, by contrast, underline the capacity of definitions to make it disappear. The
question  of  ontological  vagueness  is  closely  tied  to  ontological  conceptions  of
atmosphere. As a result, affectedness as an ontological condition of atmospheres, as a
characteristic  of  the  relation of  one’s  state  at  a  given time and the  qualities  of  the
surroundings,  proves  the  atmosphere’s  ontological  vagueness  in  the  ‘and’  of  it.
Atmosphere becomes a concept conceptualizing vagueness in the world. Seen from these
different  angles,  vagueness  makes  atmosphere  non-categorical  but  at  the  same time
accessible via discourse. It is vagueness that stands before the sum of one’s subjective
state  and  the  qualities  of  one’s  setting  like  an  uncertainty  factor.  It  is  thus  to  be
emphasized that atmospheres are not to be found in a mere enumeration of perceptual
components,  but rather represent a surplus,  one that is  above all  recognizable in the
discovery of an atmosphere. As a classical paradigm of vagueness, the sorites paradox,
with  its  formulaic  structure,  may  indeed  appear  to  present  us  with  a  process  of
enumeration or atomization. In the context of atmospheres, however, it precisely points
to  the  problems  generated  by  qualitative  objects  of  perception.  While  enumeration
functions quantitatively according to the model 1+1=2 (as if only the sum counts, the
many), the perception of atmosphere functions qualitatively according to the model 1
+1=1 (it is about quality, the quality of an atmosphere made up of single components).
Atmosphere emerges as a “tempest of blurred islands,” (Schmitz in Hahn, 2012, p. 72)12 an
image that  draws our  attention to  the  liquefaction and fluidity  of  the  phenomenon.
Schmitz’  definition  provides  similar  support  for  our  understanding  of  vagueness:
“Feelings are spatial, but have no locus; they are poured-forth atmospheres” (Schmitz,
2009, p. 23)13. For – as is particularly the case in the social sciences – if one understands a
‘locus’ or site as a geometrically fixed point in space, and ‘space’ itself as a multiplicity of
possible locations,  then,  through its  opposition of ‘space’  and ‘locus’,  a  fluid,  flowing
indeterminacy is implied within this definition which is only rendered more pronounced
by the choice of a term such as ‘poured-forth’.
 




19 Whether arising formally or phenomenally,  the vagueness of  atmosphere presents us
with difficulties,  particularly  when  sighted  on  safe  terrain:  as  if  among  the  clouds,
contemporary art appears to have become ungraspable, nebulous, and vague as a result of
its atmospheric character. In this way, it “no longer draws a distinction between art and
life”, the critical potential of the concept of atmosphere is a “pretty illusion”, through
which  even  “the  felt  ‘sense’  of  atmospheric  art-worlds  […]  remains  in  the  balance”
(Assheuer,  2012)14.  But  perhaps  such  a  critique  acknowledges  aesthetic  phenomena
merely as a means to an end while failing to recognize them as an end in themselves. The
cloud was used above as an example for the sorites paradox, but it is also an illustrative
metaphor  for  the  difference  between  atmosphere  as  an  object  of  perception  and
atmosphere as a perceptual stance. No two clouds are the same. However, their fuzzy
peripheries do not yet indicate that they can be described as completely vague. Through
our experience of clouds and the weather phenomena attached to them, we are able to
categorize and characterize them; for example, whether they appear as a wispy ribbon on
the  distant  horizon,  colored red  by  a  sunset,  whether  they  hang low and heavy,  or
whether  they  roll  along quickly  or  rain  softly  or  torrentially.  In  order  to  sense  the
character of such moments, the object of perception and the perceiving subject must find
themselves in the same place; they must be co-present in the ‘and’ of atmosphere. Thus,
the product of this ‘and’ can become the content of perception. If one now schematically
compares cloud and atmosphere, they become objects of perception when one views them
from  a  distance  and,  despite  fragmentation  and  disintegration,  apprehends  their
particular effect. They become a perceptual stance when one finds oneself in the cloud,
when one is endlessly enshrouded in it, when the cloud thus becomes the background to
perception,  shaping and helping to shape in its  particular way the manner in which
people and objects appear. To actively perceive an atmosphere is thus more a matter of
being in the clouds than looking at them. To perceive an atmosphere at a distance is like
viewing clouds.
20 Oliver Boberg makes use of  the characterization of  mood that thus becomes possible
when he views “hundreds of  photographs of  real  skies” in order to find out  “which
aspects of cloud formations are responsible for particular, recognizable moods. These are
then sketched and, using various types of cotton wool and with the aid of light, perspex
and artificial  fog,  they are modeled in the studio.” (Boberg, 2007, p.  220)15 The cloud
formations that he thus reproduces are then shown in diptychs or in series of up to ten
individual photographs, all based on nearly the same, but each time slightly modified,
composition.  Boberg  wants  to  seize  and  commit  to  recording  something  that  is  in
permanent flux. The transitory nature of cloud formations is made clear, as well as the
vagueness of atmospheres, which even under close scrutiny are able to veil the context of
their production. However, the illusory nature of photographic reproduction is not the
main focus of this work. Much more important is a concentration on the phenomenon.
What do I perceive? How do I perceive it? Where am I? How do I feel? In the photographs
of Berndnaut Smilde,  perceptual contexts are brought together.  In his Nimbus series,
various clouds drift in interior spaces. Cloud and room are drawn into a Magrittesque
interplay. Here, too, the photographer of clouds concentrates on the phenomenon and
not on a pure aesthetic goal. The fact that clouds and atmospheres can be perceived and
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are  tangible  is  placed  at  our  disposal.  Vagueness  now  stands  as  a  touchstone  of
atmosphere discourse, initially in everyday language, but also semantically, ontologically,
or epistemically. Can one ground comprehensive perception in clear concepts – and if so,
how?
21 The  entry  of  the  topic  of  vagueness  into  the  debate  on  atmosphere  has  positive
consequences.  The emphasis on vagueness is  a corrective to a purely conceptual and
formal unfolding of the discussion. To the benefit of faithfulness to the phenomenon, the
theme of  vagueness  undermines a  hasty exactitude.  Because of  one’s  involvement in
atmospheric perception, the difference between the context of experience and that of
description becomes clear. The atmosphere debate is thus formally enriched by a feel for
unclear delineation and methodical uncertainties. It is also enriched in terms of content
by a focus on the indeterminable nature of a perceptual situation. The everyday, at times
poetic and  metaphorical  manner  in  which  atmospheres  are  discussed  becomes
understandable through vagueness.
22 The ability to move between academic and poetic language allows one to gain a linguistic
purchase on a given atmosphere. In contrast to the objective illumination of atmospheric
situations,  the “poetic  explication preserves the situation to be explicated through a
skillful frugality of expression, which, through a thin and tailor-woven veil […] allows the
intact fullness of the situation to shine through in all of its richness” (Schmitz, 2003, p.
264)16. Thus, the characters of vague atmospheres can be named and inter-subjectively
negotiated.  The  character  of  an  atmosphere  “can,  through  the  kind  of  enthralling
description enabled by metaphorical language, leave an impression with more lasting
resonance than would be the case with however precise an elaboration of details” (Hasse,
2012, p. 25)17. In studying atmospheres, not only everyday language, but also poetic and
metaphorical  language can be used in collecting data and in analyzing the results of
qualitative-empirical ‘aisthetic’ field research.
23 Aisthetic fieldwork is still a young method in the research on atmospheres.18 It attempts to
feel for and tease out varying atmospheres that border on one another or flow into one
another.  Because  empirical  research  on  atmospheres  is  still  in  its  infancy,  aisthetic
studies of this kind devote themselves primarily to the description of an atmosphere.
Because of the difference between linguistic communication and the manner in which
atmospheres are communicated, such descriptions constitute a necessary move into the
medium of language. Aisthetic fieldwork is comprised of the following three components:
the  recording  of  all  sense  impressions,  the  expansion  and supplementation  of  these
perceptions using a mnemonic protocol, and the fact that the person collecting the data is
the same as the person evaluating these data.
24 The noting down of all sense impressions as a means of preserving one’s perceptions is a
consciously chosen step. It allows access to an atmosphere as close and faithful as possible
to the moment of perception. Of utmost importance is one’s own physical presence at the
locus of study, in the ‘here and now’ of the atmosphere under investigation. Without
resorting to a potentially fallible memory, perceptions from within the sensory field or
purview of  an atmosphere are  described,  for  often atmospheres,  as  a  result  of  their
vagueness, cannot be directly named. This description approximates an embracing of the
holistic via the particular. Without regard to style or consistency, one commits to one’s
field notes individual sensory impressions and provisional descriptions that constitute
the effect and resonance of a particular atmosphere. This effect (it may also be a linguistic
one) is to be preserved in writing. In the process, however, one must avoid committing
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the error of the tourist by prioritizing a mediated access to a given atmosphere over one’s
own perceptual access, as in, for example, taking photographs in a museum rather than
relying on one’s ability to see.
25 Following  the  completion  of  these  preliminary  notes,  one  should  then  use  the
opportunity to weave into the field report amending and supplementary information drawn
from  a  mnemonic  protocol.  It  may  be  possible  that  one’s  research  notes  from  the
atmospheric field are difficult to comprehend, given the unique effect of an atmosphere
at its locus. The filling out of these notes from memory allows new descriptions to flow
into the report that may, in the sense of one’s own involvement, be more distant or
removed,  but  which  emerge  from  presumably  heightened  consciousness  of  one’s
experience of the atmosphere. These supplementary descriptions thus constitute another
methodological step preceding the evaluation of one’s notes, allowing one to regard as a
simultaneous perception individual aspects written successively. They reconstruct sense
impressions with words and reflect on the conditions under which the atmosphere was
perceived. Often, the amendments to the mnemonic protocol could be made in a language
different from the one used for the notes in the field. Because of the temporal distance
from the collection of data in the field, the language used is more reflective; in addition to
adjectives and nouns, poetic expressions and neologisms are also used, which paraphrase
the vague and carefully interweave it.
26 It  is  ultimately  important  to  avoid  discrepancies  in  one’s  use  of  vocabulary  when
evaluating one’s notes. This is made possible by the fact that the person collecting the data
and the person evaluating these data are one and the same,  allowing the idiosyncrasies of
individual usage to be compensated. The importance of certain notes will be highlighted.
If the collection of data and the ensuing evaluation remain in the hands of one person,
the  researcher  is  freed from such questions  as  may arise  regarding the  relationship
between subjectivity and objectivity in the notes, regarding the standardization of terms,
or regarding a potential biased steering of the field notes in a certain direction. Thus
freed, the researcher can more easily align his or her own descriptions regarding his or
her individual state in light of the qualities of a particular setting – in other words, the
prevailing atmosphere. In addition, the researcher is the person most qualified to connect
the  discursive  context  to  the  context  of  atmospheric  perception.  If  individual  sense
impressions are recorded in the field notes, they can thus be illustrated and interpreted
with an eye to the atmospheric whole.
27 This method of aisthetic fieldwork is based on the Parcours commenté as outlined by Jean-
Paul Thibaud and Grégoire Chelkoff. The Parcours commenté is a research technique in situ,
i.e. by means of walking together and talking to each other in the field, it explores one’s
involvement  in  an  atmosphere  according  to  the  principles  “marcher,  percevoir  et
décrire” (Thibaud, 2001, pp. 81-83).  It  centers on the following four steps:  firstly,  the
‘observer’/observing, the acknowledgement of modes of perception and attitude in the
field; secondly, the ‘accompagner’/accompanying, the description while walking; thirdly,
the ‘evoquer’/evoking/reminiscing, the reactivating of sensual impressions; and, finally,
fourthly,  the  ‘s’entretenir’/reviewing/conversing,  the  linguistic  synchronizing  of
perception. As a result, the Parcours commenté is practically geared to the description of
atmospheres  (for  instance  in  the  urban context).  Individual  linguistic  traditions  and
idiosyncrasies  can  be  leveled  out  in  a  communicative  way,  and  the  need  for
communication caused by the vagueness of atmospheres can be satisfied by means of
dialogue and commentary. For aisthetic fieldwork, the methodical synchronization of the
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observer and the observed is of key importance, as is the unity of the person collecting
the data and the one assessing it.  So it  is a method that could be seen as a Parcours
commenté exclusive to one person: the ‘accompanying’ of one’s perceptions while taking
notes, the reminiscing ‘evoking’, the ‘conversing’ with oneself, i.e. the reflection on and
evaluation  of  the  notes,  are  connected  to  only  one  language,  the  vocabulary  of  the
researcher in the field,  which should enable and augment the balancing of  linguistic
idiosyncrasies,  an appropriate evaluation of one’s own individual notes,  and thus the
appropriate reflection on said notes. The singular access provides the chance to approach
and reflect on the pre-linguistic ‘in-between’ of the atmosphere in a particularly intense
way, close to the perceptions made.
28 Aisthetic fieldwork is an open method that does not merely allow for variation, but in fact
encourages it, with the aim of bringing about a further reflection on methods. In this
form it is designed to pave the way for an empirical approach to the study of atmosphere
that  is  suitable for  and faithful  to the phenomenon at  hand.  Here,  the vagueness  of
atmospheres is not a stumbling block, but rather a milestone. A view of vagueness in the
spirit of ‘dissipation’ could call for speechlessness in the face of the pre-linguistic nature
of  the  atmosphere  phenomenon.  However,  this  contradicts  the  everyday  (linguistic)
treatment  of  atmospheres  and  absolves  one  of  responsibility  for  serious  efforts  at
utilizing  the  communicatory  potential  of  atmosphere  in  aesthetic,  (landscape)
architectural, educational,  critical,  and other contexts.  The work of  art,  which either
formally  or  in  terms  of  its  content  is  involved  in  the  creation  of  atmospheres,  is
unthinkable  without  the  perceptual  space  in  which  it  is  embedded.  It  generates
atmospheres and provides them with a commentary. In perception, one is in the clouds.
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NOTES
1. See also the explanation by Weibel, 2012, p. 155-172.
2. To  some  extent,  the  text  draws  on  my  2012  publication  “Die  besondere  Atmosphäre.
Ästhetische Feldforschungen” [“The Special Atmosphere. Aesthetic Investigations in the Field”].
It also contains original contextualizations, examples and a more elaborate approach to forms of
vagueness.
3. My  translation  of  the  original  text:  “Beziehung  von  Umgebungsqualitäten  und  menschlichem
Befinden.  Dieses  Und,  dieses  zwischen beidem,  dasjenige,  wodurch Umgebungsqualitäten und Befinden
aufeinander bezogen sind, das sind die Atmosphären”.
4. My  translation  of  the  original  text:  “prädikativen  Halbschatten  (‚penumbra‘),  in  dem  weder
Wahrheit noch Falschheit eindeutig regieren: Tertium datur.” On the tripartite nature of the zone of
reference specific to a given concept or term, consisting of clearly positive and clearly negative
instances in which the term is applied, alongside a penumbra, see also Russell, cited in Wolski,
1980, p. 87.
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5. My translation of the original text: “…scharf zu sehen ist, bedrängt den Wahrnehmenden und engt
ihn ein, da es der Fantasie jeden Spielraum nimmt.”
6. My translation of the original text: “Das Unbestimmte reizt uns mit seinem Geheimnis, das scheinbar
in Griffnähe liegt und sich doch dem definitiven Zugriff entzieht. Wir sind emotional schnell involviert. Es
handelt  sich  also  um  eine  gleichzeitig  distanzierende  und  einladende  Visualität.  Während  Schärfe
einzigartig ist, existiert die Unschärfe in vielen Abstufungen und Schattierungen. […] Dadurch weckt sie
Assoziationen und öffnet sich gegenüber emotionalen Reaktionen seitens der Betrachter.”
7. My translation of the original text: “Sparten ästhetischer Arbeit.”
8. See Buldt, 2001, p. 531; also Sorensen, 2006: “Vagueness is standardly defined as the possession
of borderline cases. […] Borderline cases are inquiry resistant.” On the sorites paradox generally,
see also Sainsbury, 2001, p. 41 and Williamson, 2005, p. 8-25.
9. For a more thorough treatment of the three possibilities named here, see Sainsbury, 2001, p. 51
and Rauh, 2012, p. 183.
10. My translation of the original text: “…aufgrund fehlender eindeutiger räumlicher Grenzen infolge
vager Teilzugehörigkeit.”
11. My translation of the original text: “Bereich der unmittelbaren Empfindung und leiblichen Regung
.”
12. My translation of the original text: “Gewoge verschwommener Inseln.”
13. My translation of the original text: “Gefühle sind räumlich, aber ortlos, ergossene Atmosphären.”
14. My translation of the original text: “…keinen Unterschied mehr zwischen Kunst und Leben; schöne
Illusion; der gefühlte ‚Sinn‘ der atmosphärischen Kunst-Welten […] in der Schwebe.”
15. My translation of the original text:  “Hunderte von Fotografien von realen Himmelssituationen;
welche  Komponenten  von  Wolkenformationen  für  eine  bestimmte,  wiedererkennbare  Stimmung
verantwortlich sind. Diese [werden] wiederum durch Skizzen fixiert und im Atelier mittels verschiedenster
Sorten von Watte und unter Zuhilfenahme von Licht, Plexiglas und Kunstnebel in einer Art Modellsituation
inszeniert.”
16. My  translation  of  the  original  text:  “…schont  die  poetische  Explikation  die  zu  explizierende
Situation durch geschickte Sparsamkeit  der Rede,  die  hinter einem dünnen, aber passend und treffend
gewebten  Schleier  […]  die  ungebrochene  Ganzheit  der  Situation  mit  der  binnendiffusen  Fülle  ihrer
Bedeutsamkeit durchscheinen lässt.”
17. My  translation  of  the  original  text:  “…drängt  sich  in  der  packenden  Beschreibung  dank  der
metaphernhaften Rede nachhaltiger auf, als er in noch so detaillierter Genauigkeit von Einzelheiten hätte
dargelegt werden können.”
18. For more details see Rauh, 2012, p. 203.
ABSTRACTS
To define ‘atmospheres’ as phenomena between object and subject in the process of perception
has almost generally been accepted. Atmospheres are experienced in terms of affect as quasi-
objective, free-floating emotions. Given that, how may an atmosphere be described adequately?
In the course of listing the multiple characteristics of atmosphere, problems that have to do with
language  emerge.  By  juxtaposing  the  order  of  language  and  the  order  of  perception,  the
vagueness  of  atmospheres becomes  visible  –  as  the  sorites  paradox  (accumulation)  shows.  Yet
descriptions of atmospheres do not have to be vague; they can evoke different characters of
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atmospheres. The issue of vagueness is discussed from a semantic, ontological and an epistemic
perspective. Atmospheres can be made tangible by means of the qualitative-empirical method of
‘aesthetic fieldwork’. This method stresses three methodological aspects as a consequence of the
vagueness  of  atmospheres.  It  is  based  on  the  Parcours  commenté and  entails  a  subject-
concentrated approach to atmospheres in order to avoid the traps of the forms of vagueness.
La définition des ambiances comme phénomène entre le sujet et l’objet dans le processus de la
perception  peut  être  considérée  comme  établie.  Les  ambiances  sont  éprouvées  de  manière
affective comme des objets-sentiments dans l'espace environnant. Si tel est le cas, il convient
alors de se demander comment décrire ces ambiances d'une manière adéquate. Quand on établit
la  liste  des  caractéristiques  requises,  des  problèmes  liés  au  langage  apparaissent :  dans
l'affrontement entre l'ordre du langage et celui de la perception, le vague des ambiances apparaît –
comme le montre les paradoxes sorites (paradoxes de l’accumulation). Pourtant les descriptions
d'ambiances ne sont pas seulement vagues mais aussi capables d'évoquer différents caractères de
ces dernières. Le problème du vague sera abordé d’un point de vue sémantique, ontologique et
épistémologique.  Grâce  à  la  méthode  qualitative-empirique de  l'analyse  scientifique  du  champ
esthétique, les ambiances peuvent être décrites plus précisément. Cette méthode souligne trois
aspects  primordiaux  comme  conséquences  du  “vague  des  ambiances”.  Elle  se  base  sur  le
processus du parcours commenté et développe une approche des ambiances très centrée sur le
sujet pour éviter les pièges des formes du vague.
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